"He hath not done this for any other nation": Mexico\u27s 1970 and 1986 World Cups by Brewster C & Brewster K
 Newcastle University ePrints 
 
Brewster, C. and Brewster, K. (2014)  
"He hath not done this for any other nation": Mexico's 1970 and 1986 World Cups.  
In: Stefan Rinke and Kay Schiller (eds.)  
The FIFA World Cup 1930-2010: Politics, Commerce, Spectacle and Identities.  
Gottingen, Germany: Wallstein Verlag, pp.199-219. 
 
 
Copyright: 
This is the authors’ manuscript of a chapter published in its final, definitive form by Wallstein Verlag, 
2014. 
For more information see: 
http://www.wallstein-verlag.de/9783835314573-the-fifa-world-cup-1930-2010.html 
Always use the definitive version when citing. 
 
Date deposited: 28th January 2015 [made available 1st May 2016] 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 
 ePrints – Newcastle University ePrints 
http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
1 
 
Claire and Keith Brewster,  
“He hath not done this for any other nation”: Mexico’s 1970 and 1986 World 
Cups  
Had the views of the many dissenters been taken into consideration, it is 
unlikely that Mexico would have made FIFA history by becoming the first 
nation to host the World Cup finals twice.  Despite widespread euphoria at 
being selected to host the 1968 Olympic Games (itself unique with Mexico 
being the first developing country to stage it) many Mexicans questioned the 
inevitable huge government expenditure in a country with extensive poverty.  
For them, to take on a similar international responsibility only two years later 
was excessive, if not foolhardy.  Similarly, when in 1982 a drop in oil prices 
provoked a major crisis for the Mexican economy, few believed it wise to host 
a second World Cup tournament in 1986.  Moreover the destructive 
earthquake in September 1985, which killed and injured thousands of people 
and left parts of Mexico City in ruins, persuaded many that preparing for a 
football tournament was not a priority.  Yet projects of such a grand, visionary 
scale are the domain of economic and/or political elites; only when decisions 
have been finalised are these visions sold to the public.1 
Mexicans have long been the recipients of nuanced top-down messages.  
Patriotic rhetoric and state patronage have helped to sustain a political system 
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that, in 1990, the Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa described as a “perfect 
dictatorship”:2 a single-party state that, through co-option, coercion and rigged 
elections, had maintained control since 1929.  This political stability was 
assisted by unprecedented economic growth in the 1950s, which was fuelled 
by Mexico’s lucrative oil industry and import substitution policies that 
protected Mexican businesses and sustained welfare provision.  Yet Mexico’s 
so-called “economic miracle” left the majority of the population cut adrift.  
Rural poverty stimulated migration to cities in which inadequate opportunities 
left many living in shanty towns and forced into the informal economy to 
sustain their families.  This is not to say that football played no part in their 
lives.  Quite the contrary, domestic football was well-established, strongly 
supported, and performed at amateur and professional levels throughout the 
Republic.  As such there is little doubt that hosting a World Cup tournament 
would bring pleasure to many and offer opportunities for some to benefit from 
the expected influx of visitors.3  Yet the >bread and circus< rationale should 
not be taken too far; it seriously underestimates the ability of ordinary 
Mexicans to look beyond the temporary sense of well-being that hosting such 
a tournament might produce.  Thus, as with political elections, decisions 
regarding international sport were taken by those accustomed to working in 
lofty circles and beyond the reach of ordinary Mexicans. 
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This chapter examines the processes by which Mexico hosted the 1970 and 
1986 World Cup finals.  It identifies the key figures behind the bids and 
explores how their domestic and international networks helped to secure the 
finals for Mexico.  At one level, the longevity and pervasive influence of the 
Mexican economic elite connects our analysis: more specifically, certain 
individuals within the media sector.  Yet to rehearse the ways in which 
Mexican media magnates were able to >win< these World Cups for Mexico 
would only give one perspective; one that we believe has been accurately 
portrayed in existing studies.4  As such, we provide only a brief contextual 
outline of this aspect of the Mexican World Cups in order more fully to 
understand the debate within the host nation.  Of greater interest is the 
interaction between the promoters of Mexico’s World Cups, the country’s 
politicians, and those who purported to reflect public opinion: for example, 
how political capital was made from hosting the events and how, in presenting 
them to the public, politicians negotiated a path between patriotic jingoism 
and the need for economic prudence.  We explore the nature of the popular 
reactions, the extent to which objections could be voiced, and how this varied 
between the 1970 and 1986 tournaments.  In effect, while we scrutinise the 
laughter of the audience to discern the ways in which the circus was enjoyed, 
we also consider the views of the disgruntled onlookers who displayed 
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cynicism towards the ringmaster and were apprehensive about their 
forthcoming daily bread.  We argue that, unlike other countries, hosting the 
World Cup did not change Mexican attitudes towards football.  The game was 
popular before 1970 and remained so after 1986.  Nor did the events foster a 
change in the socio/political dynamics of the country.  Instead, we attempt to 
understand how underlying changes in Mexican politics and society were 
reflected in the hosting of its World Cups. 
 
The men with vision 
In any study that analyses the reasons why Mexico won bids to host the 1970 
and 1986 World Cups, two names loom large: the Mexican media tycoon, 
Emilio Azcárraga, and Guillermo Cañedo, the “emperor” of Mexican football.5  
Initially in radio, and later in television, the Azcárraga media empire 
Telesistema Mexicana SA (TSM, later renamed Televisa) grew to become the 
world’s biggest Spanish-speaking broadcaster.  By the 1960s the company 
controlled Mexican football broadcasting rights, owned a major domestic 
football team (América), and provided the private finance for the newly-
constructed Estadio Azteca, a prestigious, state-of-the-art football stadium 
with a 100,000 spectator capacity.6  Businessman Guillermo Cañedo was vice-
president of the América and Zacatepec football clubs.7  As president of the 
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Mexican Football Federation (FMF) he worked to strengthen Mexico’s regional 
presence within FIFA through the Football Confederation of North and Central 
America and the Caribbean (CONCACAF).  When Azcárraga placed Cañedo at 
the head of Televisa’s football broadcasting, it cemented a business 
relationship characterised by overlapping mutual interests. 
If one encapsulates the reasons why these individuals pursued and delivered 
two World Cups for Mexico they can be reduced to three themes: technology, 
networking, and business acumen; the importance of each varying between 
the two tournaments.  In obtaining the 1970 finals, Cañedo’s close connections 
with the incumbent FIFA president, Stanley Rous, were essential.  These ties of 
loyalty date back to September 1961 when Cañedo successfully lobbied for the 
creation of CONCACAF.  An influential Mexican sports journalist, Jorge Ventura, 
claims that CONCACAF votes subsequently helped Rous to become president 
of FIFA and that in return Rous told Cañedo:  “If the recently created 
confederation helps me win the presidency of FIFA, you will be able to count 
on my total support for the Mexican candidature for 1970.”8 
More substantially, perhaps, advanced technology gave Mexican broadcasters 
a decisive edge over their competitors.  Mexico was the first country to use the 
“early bird” satellite system, and successfully transmitted images of the 1966 
World Cup from the United Kingdom into Mexican homes via New York.9  In 
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addition, the 1968 Olympics underlined the capacity of Mexican organisers 
who delivered live satellite images of a global sporting event in colour for the 
first time.  In 1967 Cañedo and Ernesto Barrientos of TSM had assured FIFA 
that not only would viewers receive high-quality images for the 1970 World 
Cup, but they would also benefit from replays and slow-motion for the first 
time.10  Cañedo’s pitch was all the more compelling as Mexico’s main bidding 
rival, Argentina, was still labouring with a black-and-white television system.11 
This same entrepreneurial edge may have played a significant role in gaining 
Mexico its second World Cup.   When, on 11 November 1982, Colombia 
notified FIFA that it could no longer host the 1986 finals, Mexico was quick to 
step in.  Officially, Colombia’s renunciation was due to economic and security 
issues that made it impossible to satisfy the stringent requirements that FIFA 
had retrospectively placed upon host countries.  Colombia’s withdrawal 
triggered what several commentators believe to be a phoney bidding process 
between Mexico, Canada, the United States and, fleetingly, Brazil (whose 
subsequent withdrawal is largely attributed to FIFA president João Havelange’s 
determination to thwart the re-election of the incumbent Brazilian Football 
Federation’s president).12   
Suspicions that from an early stage FIFA preferred Mexico are hard to 
confirm, but the almost cursory final presentation that the Mexican 
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delegation made to FIFA suggests prior knowledge.  As in 1970, the validity 
of Mexico’s case was helped immeasurably by Cañedo’s continuing influence 
within FIFA: he had become vice-president of the organisation in 1968.  
Cañedo maintained that any host nation needed a broadcasting network 
that was sufficiently large to reach every corner of the world with an 
interest in football.  He underlined, “Colombia does not have this.  I can also 
say with certainty that Brazil, although it has a television service that is in 
some ways better than Mexico’s, does not have a structure capable of 
broadcasting a World Cup.”13  Rafael del Castillo, then president of FMF, 
claims that the Mexican delegation had tried to obtain the 1986 World Cup 
before Colombia withdrew.14  According to Ventura, Cañedo perceived an 
opportunity, “when FIFA’s Executive Committee began to realise that 
Colombia’s problems were not just financial but also because its television 
structure was neither publically nor privately owned”.  He explained that the 
Colombian government “controlled the signal, and different companies had 
to bid every year for specific viewing slots”.15  Whereas other countries 
might have struggled to create the necessary infrastructure and 
installations, Mexico had already constructed most of these for its 1968 
Olympics and 1970 World Cup.  The two major domestic television 
networks, Televisa and Canal 13, had become part of a consortium headed 
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by Cañedo’s Organización de Televisión Iberoamericana (Organisation of 
Ibero-American Television).  Together they would share the responsibility of 
transmitting Mexico 86 to a growing global audience.  The most costly 
investment to satisfy the demands of a global audience would be a new 
satellite, but the national government had already undertaken to 
underwrite this cost before there was a possibility of Mexico hosting the 
1986 World Cup.16 
Cañedo’s rationale regarding Mexico’s superior broadcasting facilities may 
have seen off its Latin American competitors but could not hold the same 
weight against Canada and the United States, especially as the latter’s bid 
enjoyed US$10 million backing from Warner Bros.  What Cañedo did 
possess, however, was a close relationship with Havelange, the foundation 
of which lay in Cañedo’s backing for Havelange’s presidential campaign 
against Rous in 1974.  Following FIFA’s selection of Mexico, the president of 
the US football confederation expressed his disappointment, while Henry 
Kissinger lamented “Mexico had better diplomacy than us”.17  This was 
praise indeed from the world’s then most influential diplomat who had 
belatedly been recruited to swing the vote in favour of the United States.  
Certainly Cañedo’s incessant lobbying, which included a meeting between 
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Havelange and the Mexican president-elect Miguel de la Madrid, left FIFA in 
no doubt regarding the Mexican government’s commitment to the bid.18    
While Cañedo’s devotion to football is unquestionable, what bound 
Azcárraga, Cañedo and Havelange together was the huge potential of media 
coverage to reach new audiences and, importantly, new markets.  In this 
respect, we agree with John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson that the world’s 
most influential sports bodies had been slow to realise such potential.19  The 
IOC had somewhat naively allowed the Mexican Olympic Organising 
Committee to take the lion’s share of revenues from broadcasting rights in 
1968, and FIFA appeared equally unaware of the commercial potential of 
Mexico 70.  Helmut Kasser, then secretary-general of FIFA, expressed 
surprise regarding the commercialisation of Mexico’s coverage of the 1970 
finals, which included broadcasting advertisements during play, something 
that was then unusual in Europe.20  As Claudia Fernández and Andrew 
Paxman point out, Emilio Azcárraga was so convinced of the potential gains 
to be made that he paid an unprecedented US $1.6 million to FIFA to give 
TSM exclusive television rights for the 1970 World Cup.  TSM then re-sold 
the European broadcasting rights to the UK company, Worldwide Sport, for 
US $2.1 million.21  Other business interests were also at stake: Modelo beer 
and Banco de Comercio had sponsored the 1966 World Cup “to serve the 
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public and strengthen sport in Mexico” and both companies pledged to do 
the same for the 1968 Olympics and 1970 World Cup.22  By 1986, FIFA was 
fully aware of the commercial power of media and extensively used 
Cañedo’s considerable connections “[to embrace] the world of marketing 
and sponsorship”.23 
Their years of media experience no doubt convinced Azcárraga and his 
associates that they could sell two Mexican World Cups to the world.  Selling 
two Mexican World Cups to fellow Mexicans, however, called for a different 
approach that recognised the multiple political, social and economic 
dynamics involved.  While Modelo beer might claim to support the 
tournament for the benefit of Mexicans, such glossy rhetoric was unlikely to 
repel the cynicism of its critics.  It is to this task that we now turn. 
 
For the Good of the Nation 
Burbank et al summarise the usual public reaction in countries that host 
mega-sports events.  Excitement and criticism accompany the bid, followed 
by euphoria when it is successful; the preparations are characterised by 
concern regarding an ability to deliver coupled with a sense of national 
obligation, while almost total support and goodwill is shown during 
delivery.24  In the case of Mexico, several variables impinge upon this 
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pattern of behaviour.  The first is a restricted opportunity of expressing true 
emotions and criticism.  In 1970 the printed media and broadcasters largely 
operated in an atmosphere of self-censorship or blatant partisanship for the 
ruling political party.  Not until 1976 did editors begin resolutely to contest 
government control.25  The plethora of more critical publications that 
emerged in this period significantly altered the printed media’s reception of 
the 1986 World Cup and, as such, forms one of our analytical perspectives.  
A second factor is Mexico’s status as a developing nation, which tended to 
deepen concerns over expenditure while heightening sensitivity to foreign 
criticism.  The third factor is that of precedent.  The 1970 World Cup 
followed an Olympic Games before which the Mexicans’ ability to deliver 
had been constantly and savagely attacked by the foreign press.  The 
consequent entrenched mentality and indignation meant that when Mexico 
did produce a successful Games, the taste of success was considerably 
sweeter.  By 1986, Mexico had a strong track record of staging global sports 
events and hence protecting national pride proved to be less of a rallying 
cry. 
The political and public debates accompanying Mexico’s World Cups reflect 
some of these variables.  Having acted as the ultimate financial guarantor 
for the Olympic Games, incumbent president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-70) 
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was adamant that the 1970 World Cup would be privately financed and that 
he would not redirect public funds from more pressing needs.  A successfully 
run event would nonetheless, the president confirmed, spotlight the 
nation’s supreme self-assuredness on the world stage.26  On gaining the 
1986 finals similarly cost-conscious but upbeat proclamations were made.  
President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) emphasised that Mexico’s sporting 
infrastructure, its organisation, and the place of football in Mexican hearts 
were already in place.  As such, he added, budgets would be minimised 
because existing installations would be used.27  A jubilant Cañedo confirmed 
that preparations would begin immediately to ensure that Mexico 86 would 
surpass Mexico 70.28  The Regent of Mexico City, Ramón Aguirre, underlined 
that the participants and spectators would witness and enjoy traditional 
Mexican hospitality in an atmosphere of peace and stability; the secretary of 
the Mexican Olympic Committee emphasised the consequent increase in 
tourism and that Mexico was already prepared for such an occasion.29  The 
veteran goalkeeper of Mexico’s 1970 team, Ignacio Calderón, proclaimed 
that the 1986 World Cup would be a “fabulous” inspiration for Mexican 
youths who would again have the opportunity to learn from foreign 
players.30  The daily newspaper, El Universal, published enthusiastic 
comments from other sporting figures and a supportive discussion on the 
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economic benefits of hosting the World Cup, especially in terms of increased 
tourism.31   
These positive reactions to the Mexico 86 finals were similar to those seen in 
the years preceding both the 1968 Olympics and 1970 World Cup.  What had 
changed by the 1980s, however, was the prevalence of increasingly critical 
comments voiced in a printed media that was enjoying greater freedom of 
expression than in the past.  Importantly, disapproval of hosting the World 
Cup extended to political, economic and social matters; a natural reaction, 
perhaps, given the recent devaluation of the Mexican peso and the 
subsequent economic turmoil.  An article in the daily newspaper Excélsior, 
for example, conceded that after having stepped in to stage the competition 
Mexico could not make an honourable retraction, but warned that the 1970 
World Cup had left Mexico with many debts that exacerbated, “that other 
great madness, the Olympiad of two years earlier”.32  Writing in the weekly 
magazine Proceso, Francisco Ponce lamented, “I hope there’s been a big 
mistake and that the United States, not Mexico, has been selected as host”.  
He drew attention to Mexico’s current social and economic problems, 
underlining the huge cost of staging the competition.33  He later reflected 
that Mexico needed to be united by good social policies not a football 
tournament.34  María Luisa Mendoza also stated her opposition: “I am 
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opposed to having the 1986 World Cup in Mexico because of the poor. [...] I 
may be a pessimist, but we have other things to worry about such as 
inflation and de-politicisation.”35  Jorge Aviles claimed that hosting the 
competition was “a tactic to take attention away from Mexico’s economic 
and political problems” and warned it would “add to Mexico’s inflation”.36  
Jorge Roldán followed the same line stating that it would bring “inflation to 
the majority and benefit a minority”.37  El Universal maintained that most 
Mexican athletes were indifferent to or unaware of Mexico’s bid and quoted 
one baseball manager’s reaction: “they should bring us food, not world 
cups”.38 
In an interesting departure from coverage of previous events, several 
journalists identified the powers behind the bid.  Jorge Aymani underlined 
Mexico’s current economic difficulties and that both Colombia and Brazil had 
declined to stage the competition.  He proclaimed, “Mexico hasn’t been the 
winner here – it’s Televisa”.39  In the same vein Francisco Ponce pointed out 
that Mexican companies were responsible for Mexico’s “success”.40  With an 
obvious irreverent reference to Mexico’s most religious icon, the Virgin of 
Guadalupe, cartoonist Rogelio Naranjo depicted Guillermo Cañedo >revealing< 
the Televisa World Cup with the words “He hath not done this for any other 
nation” [figure 1 here filename 01Naranjo].41  A letter to Proceso decried the 
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decision to award the World Cup to Mexico as “scandalous”.  It stated that this 
was a private initiative conducted by Televisa, adding that football itself had 
become a business run by the company.42  Certainly Televisa became a 
convenient scapegoat for any criticism of the organisation.  Even complaints 
from European teams about having to play during the heat of the day could be 
ascribed to the demands of television for peak viewing slots overseas.43  This 
harsh focus on Televisa must be taken within the political context that the 
commercial television channel was seen as the semi-official voice of the single-
party state whose political legitimacy was under unprecedented scrutiny at a 
time of economic crisis. 
The nature of this criticism changed perceptibly following the earthquake in 
Mexico City on 19 September 1985.44  The insensitivity of Televisa’s swift 
assurance that the World Cup would not be affected as none of the stadia had 
been damaged was only surpassed by Havelange’s reported comment that 
“the earthquake respected football”.45  Politicians debated the wisdom of 
staging the competition in the national congress.  Some pointed out that a 
great deal had already been invested and Mexico deserved to enjoy the 
benefits of the World Cup.  With Mexico already suffering economic 
difficulties, politicians on the Left called for a full analysis of the burden of 
staging it and voiced concern that reconstruction resources would be diverted 
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to ensure the smooth running of the competition.  Others called on the 
government to take over the organisation so that the “multi-million income” it 
would generate could be given to reconstruction projects rather than private 
businesses.46  In the aftermath of the economic crisis and earthquake, the 
government’s emphasis that the 1986 World Cup was a private project which 
would not need public funds paradoxically became a catalyst for a new target 
of criticism: the recipients of the profits.  
The control of income from the World Cup was not restricted to broadcasting 
rights.  Jorge Aviles Randolph identified the winners and losers involved in this 
strategy.  Maintaining that “for years football has been reduced to a business in 
our country”, he underlined that the World Cup presented an opportunity to 
amass “thousands of millions of pesos for those who have commercialised it”.  
“Credulous Mexicans” who loved football, he continued, were being exploited 
by the television consortium organising the competition in an operation that 
had “the unprecedented support of the federal government”.  He explained 
that such support was unprecedented because unlike in 1970 the organisers 
had “important sectors of governmental apparatus at their disposal”.  
Furthermore, authorised vendors inside the stadia would pay a percentage of 
their profits to the tournament organisers.  The main losers, he added, would 
be the 5,000 people who had for many years been selling items outside the 
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Aztec and University stadia and who were being prevented from doing this 
during the World Cup under the pretext of “protecting security”.47   
Such criticisms forced Cañedo onto the defensive.  After the 1986 finals he 
proclaimed, “[the World Cup] achieved its objectives: above all to present a 
new image of Mexico to the world, a world in which there is confidence, 
order, peace and organisation”.  He underlined that the private sector had 
shouldered all the associated risks in staging the competition and that this 
accounted for its success:  “We firmly believe in private initiative and that 
this World Cup shows that private initiative is the solution for Mexico.”48  Yet 
Cañedo was guarded when specifically questioned about the cost and 
income generated from the World Cup.  Eduardo Galeano maintains that 
when a Mexican journalist tried to discuss the matter Cañedo replied, “This 
is a private company that does not have to answer to anyone.”49  Was such 
sensitivity justified?  On 16 June 1986, referring to its foreign debt, José Luis 
Mejías predicted that Mexico would emerge from the World Cup with “a 
monumental headache”.50  Certainly fewer tourists visited Mexico than had 
been hoped and those who came spent less money and stayed for a shorter 
time.  The World Cup and the devaluation of the Mexican peso did see an 
11.7 per-cent increase in foreign visitors over the previous year, but this was 
far short of the anticipated 4,600,000 tourists spending $2,000 million.51  
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Further reports claimed that hotel and restaurant owners, travel agents and 
other associated businesses gained just 4 per-cent of their expected 
profits.52  Conversely, Televisa obtained 75 per-cent of the gross profits from 
its radio and television transmissions, a sum of 5,272,160,000 pesos, while 
the public sector (via the state television company Imevisión) received just 
25 per-cent.53  All of these details were published in the critical Mexican 
press.   
As Cañedo’s guarded comments reveal, both the political and economic 
elites publically wanted to measure the World Cup tournaments in terms of 
the benefits they could bring; both for Mexico’s reputation on the world 
stage and the consequent boost generated to the national economy.  It is 
clear, however, that the democratic process had sufficiently progressed to 
allow the printed media to exercise increased freedom both to reflect on 
and to inform public opinion regarding the financial aspects of the 1986 
World Cup.  The targets of their criticism can only be fully understood when 
placed within a context in which Mexico’s “economic miracle” had 
spectacularly collapsed, confidence in Mexican business was under severe 
pressure, and rumours were circulating concerning corruption among 
politicians and construction companies that many believed had exacerbated 
the death toll and damage caused by Mexico City’s earthquake.   
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>Us against them<:  Mexican identity through the media of football   
Beyond the commercial aspects of staging mega-sports events, there comes 
a time when any organising committee is forced to address the issue of how 
the event will portray the host nation’s identity, values, and character.  It 
offers an opportunity to rebrand a nation and its people on the world stage.  
Even the creation of something as seemingly innocuous as an official logo 
can be loaded with social and political significance.  In the logo for the 1968 
Olympics, for example, the Mexican Organising Committee was determined 
to present a proud combination of history and modernity, and of its ethnic 
diversity within national unity.54  Although the design for Mexico 70, chosen 
in June 1969 retained the concentric lines design of the Olympics, it was very 
different.  The head of the Olympic Organising Committee, Pedro Ramírez 
Vazquez, dismissed the World Cup mascot as the product of “uneducated 
men for an entirely different, much more limited audience”.55  While he 
might have been referring to the tacky commercialisation that a sombrero-
wearing Mexican might represent, the true significance of the logo may lie 
beneath the hat.  The inoffensive, congenial smiling figure, Juanito, (little 
Johnny) [figure 2 here] was hardly representative of most Mexicans.  He 
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might have sold well as a cute, cuddly mascot but his skin was far too pale to 
be one of their own. 
 
 
 
Reflecting on this issue at the time, Froylán López Narváez noted the 
difficulties in trying to portray the multi-layered, complex nature of Mexican 
national identity in one single image.  If it were to represent the majority of 
Mexicans, he argued, the mascot should emphasise poverty and subsistence.  
If it were to symbolise the middle classes, then a symbol depicting ambiguity, 
mimicry and accommodation would be more accurate.  If it were to embody 
the elite, he continued with a liberal dose of irony, the emblem ought not to be 
Mexican at all but North American or European.  If it were to characterise the 
present, he concluded, the most appropriate image would be confusion: a 
world in which pre-Columbian and colonial splendours coexisted with the 
impoverished conditions of working-class neighbourhoods.56  While López 
Narváez might never have made an astute marketing manager, his satirical 
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slant at Juanito does expose the degree of discomfort in selling a truly 
authentic image of Mexicans to the world.     
The mascot chosen for the 1986 World Cup displayed a more confident 
depiction of Mexico and its people.  Gone were the almost apologetic cultural 
references to Mexico and in their stead Pique: an unashamedly ebullient 
interpretation of the national stereotype - a hot, spicy chilli sporting a huge 
sombrero and a big moustache [figure 3 here].   
 
Not without its critics, Eva Velázquez pointed out that Mexico had better 
examples of flora from which to choose and warned “[this tacky image] will 
haunt us forever”.57  Defending the choice, FMF president Rafael del Castillo 
implied that the figure may have been a compromise.  Introducing Pique as an 
educational and artistic character of cultural interest, he explained there had 
been a risk that FIFA would sell the mascot concessions and the result could 
have been a light-skinned figure with curly blonde hair which would not be 
representative of Mexico.58  We suggest, however, that these two World Cup 
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mascots were products of their time and were reflective of the ways in which 
Mexicans saw themselves on the world stage.  In 1970 Juanito depicted 
ambiguity and ambivalence; a country that was unsure of its place.  In 1986, 
we see a more confident Mexico displaying a degree of defiance in taking 
ownership of the resilient stereotypes that foreigners inflicted upon the 
country.  Such an interpretation does, of course, involve a degree of 
subjectivity, but gains credence when placed within the contemporary 
background of Mexican and Latin American images abroad. 
The way in which Mexico’s international posture developed during its 
preparation and hosting of the 1968 Olympics offers valuable insight into its 
position for the 1970 World Cup.  The Olympic project began as an opportunity 
to show the world that a modern, forward-looking Mexico was ready to enter 
the developed world.  When the developed world expressed considerable 
doubt that Mexicans were capable of such a leap, the organising committee 
had to adjust its stance by portraying Mexico as a defender of the Third World 
and of Latin American solidarity.  This new posture can be most demonstrably 
seen in Mexico’s defiant stance against the western-dominated International 
Olympic Committee’s (IOC) invitation for apartheid South Africa to participate 
in the 1968 Games.  That Mexico sided with nascent African nations in their 
condemnation of apartheid was indicative of a shift in the balance of power 
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within the IOC.  No longer could its western-dominated executive board take 
emerging world compliance for granted.  (A similar process was taking place 
within FIFA and Cañedo’s switch of allegiance from the pro-South Africa Rous 
to the anti-apartheid Havelange in the 1974 FIFA presidential elections should 
be seen within this context.)  Mexican indignation at what it viewed as unfair 
foreign criticism of its country and continent produced a unifying effect and a 
gutsy determination to prove its critics wrong.59  Nowhere were these 
criticisms more strongly voiced than in the home of the reigning World Cup 
champions.        
Within Mexico, England’s 1970 team is remembered for having been 
“arrogant”, and that the manager, Alf Ramsey, described the Mexican football 
team as “true savages”.60  Relations had not begun well: in May 1969 the 
squad had arrived in Mexico City for a friendly match and ignored the awaiting 
crowd of photographers.61  Just before the World Cup finals, an article in the 
UK daily newspaper, The Guardian, described the Mexican political system as a 
“dictatorship” that had brought “ruthless stability” to Mexico.62  This provoked 
a letter of protest from the Mexican ambassador to London who expressed his 
disappointment and warned that it could undermine Mexican/ UK relations.63  
The England team’s insistence on shipping its own food and drinking water to 
Mexico caused great offence and was interpreted by some sections of the 
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Mexican press as “an obvious display of superiority from a civilised country 
when coming to one that they believe to be underdeveloped”.64  The flames 
were fanned when the imported food was unceremoniously burned at the 
quayside in Veracruz as much of the imported food breached Mexican 
quarantine regulations.  A Mexican commentator, Santiago Jaime Illescas, 
underlined the inexplicable “antipathy shown by the English who were 
discourteous and hostile to the Mexican character”.65  When England was 
knocked out of the competition there was jubilation in Mexico.66  Protesting 
that English criticism of Mexico was unjust, Rodolfo de Larosa proclaimed: 
“Mexico has always respected Great Britain and its response has been the 
opposite.  Its football team is the most disagreeable that has won the World 
Cup.  That is no longer our problem...  And without further ado, au revoir.”67  
 Anglo-Mexican tensions took place within the background of the 1966 World 
Cup in which there had been much European (predominantly British) press 
criticism against the alleged dirty play of Latin American teams.68  Ramsey’s 
injudicious description of the Argentine players as “animals” did little to ease 
the tension.  In the event, the 1970 finals in Mexico were completely different.  
As the FIFA official report states, “the final tournament in Mexico not only 
produced some remarkably good football, but also many good football 
matches which were played in the best spirit of sportsmanship”.69  Yet previous 
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foreign criticism of the Latin American style had placed the hosts on the 
defensive and led to a spirit of Latin American solidarity.  “[The Mexican public] 
gave passionate support to Mexico while it was in the competition and then 
supported Brazil, but it also applauded other nationalities when they deserved 
it.”70  Far from “rough play”, in 1970 Mexicans celebrated a more positive 
“Latino” stereotype, that of displaying individualism, ball retention and 
invention in the mastery of football.71     
Analysing public and media comments in 1986, it is apparent that Mexico had 
moved on.  It was less vulnerable to foreign criticism and more confident in 
fighting its corner, but Latin American solidarity remained strong.  When it 
became clear, for example, that Mexico had defeated the US bid to host the 
tournament, the Colombian president, Belisario Betancur, congratulated the 
Mexican president and expressed his pride and pleasure that a Latin American 
country was taking Colombia’s place.72  More overt emphasis that Mexico had 
>beaten< the United States in staging the 1986 World Cup was evident: El 
Universal published a photograph of a “disconsolate” Kissinger alongside 
Germany’s Franz Beckenbauer, who had pledged support for the US bid.73  
Cartoonist Rossas depicted a drunken man who laments: “If only we’d 
defended ourselves against the United States with as much passion as we did 
for the World Cup then Texas, New Mexico and California would still be ours 
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today.”74  When Mexico was eliminated from the 1986 competition, national 
allegiances again turned to Latin American, this time Argentina.  Rafael Sola 
explained:  “We have a brotherly tie towards this country that’s such a long 
way from us, at the other extreme of the continent.”  The new sensation - 
Diego Maradona became Mexico’s adopted national hero.75 
Just how much Mexico had changed is reflected in the domestic rhetoric of 
Mexico 86; it emphasises the tenacity, almost phoenix-like quality of the 
Mexican people to triumph against the odds.  Djuka Julius, for example, 
underlined that Mexico had the chance to present, 
a true image with all its lights and shadows, its advances and 
setbacks. […] Now, Mexico can show the world what it really is, a 
nation in crisis, a growing crisis, with serious problems and 
challenges, but also with great opportunities and potential progress.   
[…]  The World Cup isn’t going to solve any problems.  But by staging 
it, Mexico’s showing that everything is not lost.76   
Raúl Carranza y Rivas also reflected on what hosting World Cup meant to the 
country: 
Above all it’s the opportunity to be seen.  What will be seen?  A 
country in the middle of things, comprising several rich and dissimilar 
elements.  We have a profusion of nature, a variety of terrain and a 
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wonderful pre-Hispanic heritage.  We’re hospitable, generous and 
sad. […] Mexico 86 is everything, even the memory of a terrible 
earthquake.  It’s the nation united by a tragedy, it’s the debt, the oil 
reserves that the devil gave us long ago.  It’s the Suava Patria today 
altered and wounded. […] The truth […] is that football has filled a 
place in the conscience of the people. […] Mexicans will suffer if our 
team loses or plays badly; and I don’t even want to think about the 
disorder if we win. [...] The earthquake, the crisis, the foreign injury, 
the debt, inflation, absolutely everything stops during a football 
match.77 
Fears that such raw emotions might overspill accompanied the riotous 
celebrations in the streets of Mexico City after Mexico beat Belgium in the 
opening match.  Announcing the result on Televisa, Jacobo Zabludowsky stated 
that football had motivated greater displays of Mexican nationalism than those 
of Independence celebrations.  José Luis Camacho, however, questioned the 
origins of such emotions and blamed Televisa for fuelling the situation.  There 
had been chaos as Mexico City was paralysed: youths prevented workers from 
returning home, businesses were damaged, public monuments were defaced, 
and passers-by threatened in >celebrations< that went on until midnight.  
Claiming that the nation had been “damaged” by such scenes, Camacho 
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underlined that reporters had not questioned the nature of this “football 
nationalism promoted by Televisa”.  He explained that there had not been any 
censure of the ensuing chaos created by the thousands of fans who, moreover, 
had been incited by Televisa commentators.78   
There were similar scenes following Mexico’s victory over Bulgaria to qualify 
for the quarter-finals.  After achieving its highest position to date in an 
international competition, Excélsior described how 
the ensuing uncontrollable jubilation and vandalism turned a 
sporting victory into a civic defeat. […] It’s lamentable that this could 
happen in Mexico today.  Mexico doesn’t need to win a World Cup; it 
needs to reflect on its social problems, on its roots as a nation, and 
on the future it wants to achieve.  There’s clearly still a long way to 
go before it achieves maturity. 79   
Other commentators, however, preferred to focus on more positive aspects.  
Defending the tournament, the Bishop of Mexico City acknowledged that 
although Mexicans could not ignore their problems completely, the World Cup 
provided “a festive spirit that had given people something to cheer about”.80  
Certainly, the scenes of jubilation notwithstanding, crime levels fell for the 
duration of the tournament: there were just five arrests for minor offences in 
the Mexico City stadia.81  Excélsior reported with apparent relief that the World 
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Cup had ended “happily, because there were no major incidents”.  Moreover, 
it underlined, this was not merely a “triumph of private initiative”, but very 
much a team effort: 
The World Cup was a show of Mexico’s organisational capacity, of its 
society working together: people and government, businesses and 
authorities, along with the highly important role of all citizens.  The 
most important thing was the triumph of peace and tranquillity: not 
even international terrorists wanted to disturb the peace in a 
country that has gained so much international respect.  Viva Peace!  
Viva this beloved Mexico with all its defects and its crisis!82 
 
Concluding remarks  
Trying to encapsulate the diverse aspects of any one mega-sports event is a 
challenge.  To attempt to make sense of two held within the same country is 
significantly more complex.  In our comparison of Mexico 70 and Mexico 86 we 
have tried to identify and analyse the lines of continuity that link the two 
events and to consider how these continuities faced the changing international 
and domestic pressures of their contemporary circumstances.  There is no 
doubt that Mexican business interests were behind both bids, that Mexican 
networking helped secure them, and that in both tournaments Mexican media 
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expertise delivered the best coverage technology could produce.  At one level, 
then, these private enterprises secured exceptional profits for their investors 
and at the same time delivered intangible benefits to Mexico and its people by 
efficiently fulfilling Mexico’s international obligations.  Yet there comes a time 
in the organisation of any mega-sports event when ownership of the event is 
partially released from those who conceived the project and becomes open to 
public scrutiny.  In the case of the Mexico World Cups, any rational response to 
the suggestion that Mexico should act as host in either 1970 or 1986 ought to 
have considered the state of the Mexican economy and the more pressing 
needs of its people.  Indeed, such matters were raised on both occasions, and 
were especially evident in the more open media environment of the 1980s.  
Yet it is interesting to study how such criticism reflected the times in which 
Mexicans were living.  In 1970, economic confidence of the elite within Mexico 
was high and rhetoric sustained that the “economic miracle” might trickle 
down to the poorer sectors of society.  Control of the press was so firm that 
the role of the private sector attracted little criticism and was in any case 
eclipsed by the aura of optimism created by the 1968 Olympics.  The 1986 
World Cup, conversely, took place in an environment in which many Mexicans 
from all social classes had lost their jobs as a result of mistakes deemed to 
have been committed by politicians and the business sector.  Moreover, 
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although the 1985 earthquake may have “respected football” it did not respect 
social hierarchies.  It exposed the use of inferior materials by corrupt 
construction companies and the inadequacy of national politicians in the 
immediate aftermath of the emergency.  It is little wonder, then, that the 
commercial aspect of the World Cup was exposed to severe public examination 
and criticism: views which, as we have shown, were strongly voiced in Mexico’s 
more open printed media.   
Yet when moving from the internal dynamics of the World Cups to gauge 
public reactions to foreign attitudes towards the host nation, in both 1970 and 
1986 Mexicans united to defend their country’s prestige.  The spirit of triumph 
over adversity was apparent in both World Cups: foreign criticism represented 
just one more hurdle for Mexico to overcome.  Mexicans took comfort from 
their own tenacity and in solidarity with its often maligned Latin American 
neighbours.  The capacity to deal with whatever fate placed before them was 
something that sustained Mexicans either side of the four-week football 
festivals that visited their nation.  Sports journalist and passionate football fan 
Fernando Marcos acknowledged that the 1986 World Cup would be run by 
business interests.  “But in the end we’re saying, ‘that doesn’t matter.  We’re 
going to host the Cup.’”83  Two World Cups may have been >excessive<, but for 
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millions of Mexican football fans everything else could stop for the duration of 
a football match.   
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